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Abstract
Modern aircraft rely heavily on dependable opera-
tion of many safety-critical software components.
Despite careful design, verification and validation
(V&V), on-board software can fail with disastrous
consequences if it encounters problematic software/
hardware interaction or must operate in an unexpec-
ted environment.
We are using a Bayesian approach to monitor the
software and its behavior during operation and pro-
vide up-to-date information about the health of the
software and its components. The powerful reas-
oning mechanism provided by our model-based
Bayesian approach makes reliable diagnosis of the
root causes possible and minimizes the number of
false alarms. Compilation of the Bayesian model
into compact arithmetic circuits makes SWHM
feasible even on platforms with limited CPU power.
We show initial results of SWHM on a small simula-
tor of an embedded aircraft software system, where
software and sensor faults can be injected.
INTEGRATED SOFTWARE HEALTH MANAGEMENT FOR AIRCRAFT GN&C
Software Can Fail
Despite careful SW development and
V&V, safety-critical SW can fail.
F-22 Raptors crossing the date-line:
SW bug caused loss
of navigation and
communication
Harrier Autolander:
buggy radar-altimeter
integration caused
near-crash during
landing (NASA)
SPIRIT: overfull on-board file system
caused reboot-loop
after landing
Ariane-V: SW reused
from Ariane IV caused
overflow and
destruction of rocket
ISWHM Demonstration System
For demonstration, we developed a
small embedded system/SW simulator,
where faults can be easy injected
• Plant model: open NASA F-16 model
• Operating System: OSEK (simple
real-time OS widely used in automotive
industry) simulator to show suitability
for small systems (UAV)
• simple GN&C with failure injection
• IVHM task uses arithmetic circuits
Software Health Management monitors
the system and software during
operation to
• realiably detect faults
• diagnose most likely root cause(s)
while minimizing the number of false
alarms and missed adverse events
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Results for Example Scenario
Writes to almost full on-board file
system can cause delays in the control
loop (if “badly” implemented), which
can result in aircraft oscillations similar
to dangerous PIO (pilot induced osc.).
ISWHM can detect situation (       ).
Modeling for ISWHM
ISWHM models are constructed from
(software) sensor nodes, unobservable
status nodes, and health nodes. Low
posteriors of health nodes indicate
problems and poor SW health.
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A Bayesian ISWHM
We are using Bayesian networks (BN)
to construct a model of the software
and its behavior in nominal and failure
cases. BNs can be used to
• detect failure(s), and to
• perform detailed reasoning on the
root cause of the problem
Example: low oil pressure and
vibration indicates a likely problem with
a bearing.
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Principle architecture for ISWHM
Simple Bayesian network
OSEK tasks for ISWHM demonstrator
ISWHM: SW health drops indicating problem in SW 
Bayesian ISWHM submodel
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